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ROSARIO v. ROCKEFELLER AND
KUSPER v. PONTIKESVOTERS AND OTHER STRANGERS
In Rosario v. Rockfeller,' petitioners 2 brought suit in federal court for
declaratory relief3 alleging that the New York Election Law4 had unconstitutionally deprived them of their right to vote in New York's 1972
presidential primary and had also abridged their freedom to associate
with the political party of their choice. The avowed purpose of the challenged section of this law was to prevent political party "raiding," whereby
voters in sympathy with one party enrolled themselves in an opposing
political party with the intention of voting for the weakest candidate in
1. 410 U.S. 752 (1973) [hereinafter cited in text as Rosario].
2. Petitioner, Pedro J. Rosario, was joined by William J. Freedman, Karen Lee
Gottesman, and Steven Eisner. All of the petitioners registered to vote for the first
time in December of 1971, and at that time completed an enrollment blank designating their affiliation with the Democratic Party. None of the petitioners were
permitted to vote in the Democratic primary held in New York on June 20, 1972.
Brief for Petitioner at 8 n.4, Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
3. Petitioners sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or any other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) grants original jurisdiction to the district courts in civil
actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
4. N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 186 (McKinney 1964) provides in pertinent part:
All enrollment blanks contained in the enrollment box shall remain in such
box, and the box shall not be opened nor shall any of the blanks be removed therefrom until the Tuesday following the day of the general election in that year. Such box shall then be opened by the board of elections
and the blanks contained therein shall be removed therefrom by the board,
and the names of the party designated by each voter under the declaration, provided such party continues to be a party, as defined in this law
shall be entered by the board, opposite the name of such voter in the appropriate column of the two copies of the register containing enrollment
numbers for the election district in which such voter resides. . . . When
all of the enrollments shall be transcribed from the blanks to the register,
the board of elections shall make a certificate upon the form printed in
such registers, to the effect that it has correctly and properly transcribed
the enrollment indicated on the blank of each voter to such registers. Such
enrollment shall be complete before the succeeding first day of February
in each year.
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the latter party's primary. In effect, the statute in question prohibited
otherwise qualified voters from participating in a primary election unless
their enrollments in a political party were completed at least thirty days
prior to the general election preceding the primary or about eight months
prior to the June primary. 5
In an unpublished opinion, Chief Judge Jacob Mishler of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, declared section 186 of the New York Election Law unconstitutional in violation of
the petitioners' rights to vote in a primary election, and in violation of
their first and fourteenth amendment rights to associate freely with the
political party of their choice. 6 The Court of Appeals for the Second
5. The cut-off date for enrollment provided by section 186 occurs almost eight
months before a presidential primary (held in June) and eleven months before a
non-presidential primary (held in September). N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 187 (McKinney 1964) provides exceptions for certain persons who failed to meet the cut-off
date prescribed by section 186. Section 187 includes, in pertinent part:
Application for special enrollment, transfer or correction of enrollment.
1. At any time after January first and before the thirtieth day preceding
the next fall primary, except during the thirty days preceding a spring primary, and except on the day of a primary, a voter may enroll with a party,
transfer his enrollment after moving within a county, and under certain
circumstances, correct his enrollment, as hereinafter in this section provided.
2. A voter may enroll with a party if he did not enroll on the day of
the annual enrollment (a) because he became of age after the preceding
general election, or (b) because he was naturalized subsequent to ninety
days prior to the preceding general election, or (c) because he did not
have the necessary residential qualifications as provided by section one
hundred fifty, to enable him to enroll in the preceding year, or (d) because of being or having been at all previous times for enrollment a member of the armed forces of the United States as defined in section three
hundred three, or (e) because of being the spouse, child or parent of such
member of the armed forces and being absent from his or her county
of residence at all previous times for enrollment by reason of accompanying or being with such member of the armed forces, or (f) because he was
an inmate or patient of a veterans' bureau hospital located outside the state
of New York at all previous times for enrollment, or the spouse, parents or
child of such inmate or patient accompanying or being with such inmate
or patient at such times, or (g) because he was incapacitated by illness
during the previous enrollment period thereby preventing him from enrolling.
6. Special enrollment under the classification set forth in clause (c)of
subdivision two is hereby expressly limited to a voter otherwise qualified,
who did not have the qualifications to vote at the previous general election
and such special enrollment is restricted to the same county the voter resided in at the preceding year.
6. Rosario v. Rockefeller, Civil No. 71-1573 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1972). In this
decision Judge Mishler also concluded that section 186 established a durational residence requirement, and as such, was in violation of the 1970 amendments to the Vot-
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Circuit reversed the district court's opinion, holding the statute constitutional as serving a "compelling state interest."'7 Eleven months later,
in a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's
opinion.8 In its conclusion the Court stated:
New York did not prohibit the petitioners from voting in the 1972 primary election or from associating with the political party of their choice.
It merely imposed a legitimate time limitation on their enrollment, which
they chose to disregard. 9

The Supreme Court viewed the statute as meeting the requirements of
the "compelling state interest" test on the grounds that it preserved the
integrity of New York's closed primary electoral process. 10 The decision
is unique in that it marked the first time that the Supreme Court had dealt
with a statute designed to prevent voters from "raiding" another political
party." The Court's opinion is significant in that it examines a statute
.aimed at preventing "raiding" and sanctions it by applying the "compelling
state interest" test. However, the decision is narrow since it is applicable
only to statutory schemes that use a means which does not absolutely
deprive a voter of his constitutional rights. Thus, while recognizing the
"compelling state interest" in the prevention of "raiding," the Court has
only sanctioned one particular kind of statute dealing with this problem.
This note is divided into three sections. The first section briefly suring Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1 (1970). However, the Supreme
Court later ruled that the petitioners lacked standing to argue this issue since they did
not claim to be recently arrived residents of the state nor to have moved from one
county to another nor to have changed their residence within the relevant time period and therefore could not represent a class to which they did not belong. 410
U.S. at 759 n.9. See notes 72-74 infra.
7. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 458 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'd, 41,0 U.S. 752
(1973).
8. Stewart, J.,delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which Burger,
C.J., and White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Powell, J.,wrote the dissenting opinion, in which Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, J.J. joined.
9. 410 U.S. at 762.
10. Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405-U.S. 330, 345 (1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405
U.S. 134, 145 (1972).
11. Jordan v. Meisser, 405 U.S. 907 (1972) (mem.), dealt with the same issue as
that found in Rosario but was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question
on the ground that the plaintiff could have enrolled after the cut-off date under
an exception to the challenged statute. See Rosario v. Rockefeller, 458 F.2d 649,
654 n.6 (2d Cir. 1972). Two other cases the Supreme Court has decided which have
been cited as supporting statutes designed to prevent "raiding" are Jenness v. Fort.
son, 403 U.S. 431 (1971) and Lippitt v. Cipollone, 404 U.S. 1032 (1972), affg
mem., 337 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Ohio 1971). However, both of these cases dealt
with restrictions placed upon a person's right to run as a candidate for political office
rather than upon a person's right to vote iq-a primary election.
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veys the judicial development of a citizen's right to vote in both general
and primary elections. The second section compares and contrasts the
Supreme Court's decision in Rosario with recent cases involving challenges to similar "raiding" statutes. Particular emphasis will be placed on
12
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Kusper v. Pontikes,
overturning an Illinois election law. The third section contains a
critical analysis of the Supreme Court's opinion in Rosario. This analysis
will include the author's viewpoint regarding the significance of Pontikes in relation to Rosario. Finally, the conclusions of both cases taken
together will be examined to determine the possible effects they may
have on future decisions involving statutes designed to protect the integrity of the American political process.
THE CITIZEN'S RIGHT TO VOTE IN GENERAL AND PRIMARY ELECTIONS
The right to vote, and the Supreme Court's interest in the protection

of that right against state abridgement, occupies a fundamental position
13
in this country's democratic form of government.
Nearly one hundred years ago, in Ex parte Siebold,' 4 the Supreme
Court held that Congress may enact statutes which protect every citizen
against state interference with the right to vote. In Yick Wo v.
Hopkins,'5 referring to "the political franchise of voting," the Supreme

Court stated that it was a "fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights."' 6
12. Kusper v. Pontikes, 42 U.S.L.W. 4003 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1973) [hereinafter
cited in text as Pontikes].
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (durational residence re13. See, e.g.,
quirement for voting found unconstitutional); Kramer v. Union Free School District
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (a state may not deny the right to vote to a citizen
because he does not own or lease taxable realty; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23 (1968) (state abridgment of individual's right to associate and right to vote must
serve a "compelling state interest"); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966) (a state may not impose a poll tax); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89
(1965) (a state may not deny the right to vote to a bona fide resident because
he is a member of the armed forces); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)
(a state may not dilute a citizen's vote through malapportionment); United States
v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (the right to vote in a primary election is entitled
to the same protection against state abridgment as in a general election); Nixon
v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (a state may not deny Negroes the right to vote
in a primary eleciton); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (the right to
vote is a fundamental right); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875) (a state
may not deny Negroes the right to vote in a municipal election). For additional
cases see Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 765 (1973).
14. 100 U.S. 371 (1879). See Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
15. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
16. Id.at 370.
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During the past decade, judicial decisions have vigorously protected
a citizen's right to vote against infringement of any kind. In 1964 the
Supreme Court decided Reynolds v. Sims, 1 7 in which it stated:
Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and
democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in
a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, and any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must
be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.' 8

In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,'9 the Supreme Court declared
the right to vote to be one of the fundamental rights protected by the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and concluded that
"classifications which might invade or restrain them must be closely scru0
tinized and carefully confined.'

The stringency of the language used in the above decisions laid the
foundation for the "compelling state interest" test, introduced in Williams
v. Rhodes.21 In that decision the Supreme Court said that state abridgments of an individual's first and fourteenth amendment rights were valid

only if they served the purpose of a "compelling state interest" and did
not constitute an "invidious" discrimination. 22 Less than one year later,
the Supreme Court decided Kramer v. Union Free School District No.

15,28 in which it applied the same test used in Williams to a New York
education law which restricted the vote in local board elections. The
opinion is an extremely significant one because of the distinction it made
17. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
18. Id. at 561-62; Cf. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965) which held
that: "[S]tates may not casually deprive a class of individuals of the vote because
of some remote administrative benefit to the State."
19. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
20. Id. at 670.
21. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). Williams involved a challenge to a set of Ohio statutes
which made it almost impossible for a new political party to have its name and
its candidates placed on the ballot in the general election. The Court overturned
the statutes concluding that: "The State has here failed to show any 'compelling
interest' which justifies imposing such heavy burdens on the right to vote and to
associate." Id. at 31. Cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) whre the "compelling state interest" test was used in protecting first amendment rights of association. The "compelling interest" test was much more rigid than the traditional equal
protection formula established in McGowan v. State of Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961).
The Court in McGowan stated that "[a] statutory discrimination will not
be set aside if any state facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." Id. at
426. The new test also differed from the traditional one by placing the burden
of proof in determining whether or not a statute is supported by a "compelling state
interest" on the state itself. 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968).
22. 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968).
23. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
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between the types of requirements which states place on an individual's right
to vote. The Court classified these requirements into two categories. The
first category includes the basic voting requirements of citizenship, age,
and residency. The second category includes all requirements beyond
the "basic voting requirements." These "additional" requirements are
24
subject to the "compelling state interest" test.
One of the questions examined in Rosario was whether or not this "compelling state interest" test was applicable to statutes imposing restrictions
on the right to vote in a primary election. The question was first dealt
with in Newberry v. United States.25

In that decision the Court con-

cluded that the word "elections," as used in article I of the Constitution,
did not include primary elections. The Court stated that: "General
provisions touching elections in constitutions or statutes are not neces'26
sarily applicable to primaries-the two things are radically different.
27
However, in Nixon v. Herndon, a Texas statute which denied Negroes
the right to vote in a Democratic Party primary election was declared unconstitutional in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The statute was later re-enacted giving the state executive
committee of a political party the power to prescribe the qualifications
of its party members; but in Nixon v. Condon,28 this statute was also
found to violate the Constitution.
The Nixon cases were decided under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment but did not go as far as to define "primary" as a
part of the electoral process itself. However, in the landmark decision
of United States v. Classic, 29 the Supreme Court reversed the position
established twenty years earlier in Newberry and held that the right to
vote in a primary election was entitled to the same amount of protection from state abridgment as in a general election. s0 Three years af24. [[-f a challenged state grants the right to vote to some bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to others,
the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote
a compelling state interest.
Id. at 627.
25.

256 U.S. 232 (1921).

26. Id. at 250.
27. 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
28. 286 U.S. 73 (1932). But cf. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
29. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
30. The Court stated that:
Where the state law has made the primary an integral part of the procedure of choice, or where infact the primary effectively controls the choice,
the right of the elector to have his ballot counted at the primary, is likewise included in the right protected by Article I, § 2. And this right of
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ter Classic, in Smith v. Allwright,81 the Court finally concluded that:
mhe right to vote in . . . a primary for the nomination of candidates
without discrimination by the State, like the right to vote in a general elec82
tion, is a right secured by the Constitution.

Thus, the decisions reached in the above cases make it clear that the
"compelling state interest" test must be equally applied to "additional"
restrictions placed upon a citizen's right to vote in a primary election as
well as in a general election. In Rosario, the enrollment requirement
found in section 186 of the New York Election Law is clearly an "additional" requirement since it goes beyond the basic restrictions concerning
citizenship, age, or residence. It was, therefore, subject to the scrutiny of the "compelling state interest" test. The reasoning behind the
Supreme Court's decision to uphold the statute on the ground that it
met the "compelling state interest" test lies in the specific purpose of the
statute itself. The Supreme Court for the first time was dealing with a
statute which had as its sole purpose the prevention of political party
"raiding" by voters in a primary election.8 3 The Court viewed the delayed enrollment scheme as essential in order to prevent party "raiding"
from occurring. 84 The prevention of party "raiding" was believed to be
a "compelling state interest" since it insured the preservation of the integrity of the electoral process. 85
participation is protected just as is the right to vote at the election, where
the primary is by law made an integral part of the election machinery,
whether the voter exercises his right in a party primary which invariably,
sometimes or never determines the ultimate choice of the representative.
313 U.S. at 318.
31. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
32. Id. at 661-62.
33. See note 11 supra.
34. The purpose for requiring enrollment prior to a general election was that:
Few persons have the effrontery or the foresight to enroll as say, 'Republicans' so that they can vote in a primary some seven months hence,
when they full well intend to vote 'Democratic' in only a few weeks. And,
it would be the rare politician who could successfully urge his constituents to vote for him or his party in the up-coming general election, while
at the same time urging a cross-over enrollment for the purpose of upsetting the opposite party's primary . . . . Allowing enrollment any time
after the general election would not have the same deterrent effect on
raiding for it would not put the voter in the unseemly position of asking
to be enrolled in one party while at the same time intending to vote immediately for another.
458 F.2d 649, 653 (2d Cir. 1972), as quoted in 410 U.S. at 761-62.
35. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) where the Court stated that:
"[A] state has an interest, if not a duty, to protect the integrity of its political
processes from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies." id. at 145. But cf. Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) where the Court maintained that the "prevention of
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RECENT CHALLENGES TO "RAIDING" STATUTES

Justifying the length of the time limitation for enrollment in Rosario,
the Supreme Court referred to Lippitt v. Cipollone"6 in which it affirmed
without opinion a decision of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio. The lower court had declared constitutional
an Ohio statute which made it impossible for a person to be a candidate for nomination or election in a political party primary if he had
voted as a member of another political party in a primary election within
the preceeding four years. The district court held that the statute protected a "compelling state interest" since it sought to prevent candidates
from switching parties for opportunistic reasons and therefore protected
the integrity of the political process. Rosario can be distinguished from
Lippitt since the petitioner in Lippitt was seeking to run for a political office, whereas the petitioners in Rosario were seeking to vote in a primary election. 37 This difference is significant because the right to hold
office is not a fundamental right, as is the right to vote in a primary
election.38 Thus, the issue involved in Rosario is unique, since the Supreme Court sanctioned a statute designed to prevent political party "raiding" by voters rather than by candidates.
Within the past two years, there have been several lower court opinions
dealing with statutes designed to prevent party "raiding" by voters. In
September of 1971, a federal district court 9 overturned a provision of a
[electoral] fraud is a legitimate and compelling government goal," but invalidated
Tennessee's durational residence requirements for voting in a general election as not
necessary to further a "compelling state interest." Id. at 345.
36. 404 U.S. 1032 (1972), aff'g mem., 337 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Ohio 1971);
cj. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952).

37. Cf. Brief for Lawyers for McGovern as Amicus Curiae at 9, Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973), citing Bendinger v. Ogilvie, 335 F. Supp. 572, 576
(N.D. Ill. 1971).

The state's interest in limiting candidates from switching parties .. . is
greater than its interest in limiting voters from switching parties. The
state's interest in preserving a vigorous and competitive two-party system
is fostered by the requirement that candidates demonstrate a certain loyalty
and attachment to the party in whose primary they are running; the same
cannot be said of voters, however, who should be freer to demonstrate
their changes in political attitude by voting for popular candidates or
against unpopular candidates in any party's primary election. Thus, it is
not inconsistent to prevent candidates from switching parties from election
to election and at the same time to permit voters to do so.
(Emphasis added.)

38. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1972).
39. Gordon v. Executive Comm. of the Democratic Party, 335 F. Supp. 166
(D.D.C. 1971) (per puriam).
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South Carolina election law40 which denied a voter his right to vote in a
primary election if he refused to take an oath affirming that he had not
voted in another party's primary election, convention, or precinct meeting,
within the preceeding year. The court found that "[n]o sound or compelling purpose can possibly justify 'locking' a citizen into a party and
' 41
denying to him for a full year freedom to change parties."
Less than three months later in Fonthan v. McKeithen,42 a district
court upheld a Louisiana statute43 which required a six month waiting
period after a voter had changed party affiliation before he would be
eligible to vote in a primary election. The statute was subjected to the
traditional "rational relation" test instead of the "compelling state interest" test used in Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15.44 The
Court distinguished Fonthan from the situation in Kramer on the theory
that the Louisiana statute in Fonthan was a temporary suspension of
voter eligibility, whereas the New York statute in Kramer acted as a
permanent suspension of voting rights. However, since the Louisiana restriction goes beyond reasonable citizenship, age, and residency requirements it should have been categorized as an "additional" restriction,
and as such, subjected to the "compelling state interest" test prescribed
in Kramer.4" The New York statute challenged in Rosario is similar to the
statute challenged in Fonthan, because neither act provides for a permanent deprivation of voting eligibility. In Rosario, however, the Supreme
Court correctly recognized a temporary denial of voting rights as an "additional" restriction and therefore, applied the "compelling state interest"
test to the statute.
In May of 1972, the United States District Court of New Jersey held
that certain provisions of a New Jersey election law46 were an unconstitutional burden on a citizen's right to vote and on a citizen's right
to associate freely with a political party. 47 The court stated:
[A]Ithough the defendants have met their burden of showing a compelling
interest by the state in preventing 'raiding,' the infringements on the
40.
41.
42.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-400.71 (Supp. 1971).
335 F. Supp. at 169.
336 F. Supp. 153 (E.D. La. 1971), appeal dismissed sub nom. Fantham v.

Edwards, 409 U.S. 1120 (1973).
43. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:270.204 (Supp. 1973).
44.
45.
46.

395 U.S. 621 (1969).
See note 24 supra.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:23-45 (1964).

47.

Nagler v. Stiles, 343 F. Supp. 415 (D.N.J. 1972).
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right to vote and the right of association which the State selected go far
beyond what is necessary for the protection of that interest. 48

Judge Fisher distinguished the New Jersey statute from the one found in
Rosario on the grounds that the latter accomplished its goal of inhibiting "raiding" without imposing "an excessively long commitment to a
party by a voter."' 49 The significance of this distinction is that it qualifies the statute in Rosario as one which serves a "compelling state interest" without being overly broad or making unnecessary infringements
on the right to vote and the right to associate freely. This same distinction was pointed out two months later in Yale v. Curvin.5 0 In overturning a Rhode Island statute 51 which placed a twenty-six month waiting period before persons who had switched their political affiliations
could vote in a primary election the court noted that "[u]nlike the
Rhode Island law, the New York law is narrow and does not disenfranchise a voter from a succeeding primary election."5 2 The district
court recognized the legitimate interest that the state has in the prevention of "raiding" but concluded that the twenty-six month restriction on voting was too broad and too drastic an infringement upon a citizen's constitutional rights.
On March 7, 1972, exactly one month prior to the appellate court's decision to uphold the statute in Rosario, the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois decided Pontikes v. Kusper.53 The court overturned an Illinois statute which prohibited a voter from participating in a
political party primary if he had voted in the primary of another party
within the preceeding twenty-three months. 54 Judge Swygert found the
statute to be a substantial burden on a citizen's right to vote in a primary
election as well as an infringement upon their right of free association.
Since party "raiding" by voters in Illinois was not considered to be a
serious threat, the statute designed to prevent it was not deemed as serving
a "compelling state interest," and therefore, the statute was declared invalid. 55 The opinion of the court in Pontikes was influenced by the abso48.

Id. at 418.

49.
50.

343 F. Supp. 415, 417-18 (D. N.J. 1972).
345 F. Supp. 447 (D. R.I. 1972).
R.I. GEN. LAws Ar. §§ 17-15-24, 17-16-8 (1969).

51.
52.
53.

345 F. Supp. 447, 451 (D. R.I. 1972).
345 F. Supp. 1104 (N.D. Ill. 1972)

(Marovitz, J., dissenting), afI'd, 42

U.S.L.W. 4003 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1973).
54. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 7-43(d) (1971).
55. 345 F. Supp. 1104, 1108 (N.D. Il. 1972). Referring to the statute, Judge
Swygert stated that:
The state's interest . . . could be characterized as "compelling" only if
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lute and drastic qualities of section 7-43(d). 50 Under the Illinois law,
those that choose to switch parties after voting in a primary election were
deprived of their right to vote in any primary for a period of twentythree months. The provision made it impossible for the petitioners to
vote in one party's primary in March of 1972 because they had voted
in another party's primary thirteen months earlier. Thus, the statute
had the effect of absolutely depriving petitioners of their right to vote.
However, in Rosario the Supreme Court pointed out that the New York
Election Law did not absolutely deprive the petitioners of their right to
vote in the June primary, but rather placed a cut-off date on their enrollment-which they had to meet in order to vote in the primary. 5 Thus,
the Illinois and New York statutes are distinguishable in the degree to
which they restricted the electorate's voting rights. Although both statutes
are temporary restrictions, the statute in Pontikes absolutely denies voters
their right to vote in a primary election, whereas the law in Rosario denies
the right to vote only to those persons who fail to enroll at least thirty days
prior to the general election preceeding the primary in which they wish to
vote.' 8
In November of 1973, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
district court's decision in Pontikes. 9 The absolute denial of the appellee's
right to vote in the Democratic primary election was the determining factor in the Court's opinion. 6° Referring to the effect of the Illinois statute
on the appellee's right to vote, Mr. Justice Stewart stated: "[T]he state
law absolutely precluded her from participating in the 1972' Democratic
primary."'" This distinguishing factor explains why the Court reached
opposite conclusions in Rosario and Pontikes. As Justice Stewart stated:
Unlike the petitioners in Rosario, whose disenfranchisement was caused
by their own failure to take timely measures to enroll, there was no action
. . . raiding constitutes a more important danger than the danger to constitutionally protected rights . . . [and] [tihere is no evidence to indicate
that raiding is more likely to take place than "honest" switches of affiliation.
Id. at 1108.
56. See note 54 supra.
57. 410 U.S. at 757.
58. See exemptions listed in note 5 supra.
59. Kusper v. Pontikes, 42 U.S.LW. 4003 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1973). Stewart, J.,
delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which Douglas, Brennan, White, Marshall and Powell, JJ., joined. Burger, C.J., concurred in the result. Blackmun, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion. Rehnquist, ., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun, J., joined.

60.

Id. at 4006.

61.

Id.

1974]
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that Mrs. Pontikes could have taken to make herself eligible to vote in the
1972 Democratic primary. 62

Thus, the Court found that the Illinois election law "substantially abridged"
the appellee's freedom to associate with the political party of her choice
and therefore, overturned the statute.
THE WEAKNESSES AND IMPLICATIONS OF Rosario

Before reviewing the effects that the Supreme Court's opinion in
Rosario may have on future decisions, it is necessary to examine the
opinion's inherent weaknesses. The most significant weakness in Mr.
Justice Stewart's opinion concerns his failure to apply the "least drastic
means" test 6 3 to New York's statutory enrollment scheme. Petitioners
had argued that section 332 of the New York Election Law64 offered

a "less drastic means" to prevent "raiding."6

5

However, the Court

reasoned that section 332 was "too cumbersome to have any real deterrent

Therefore, the Court concluded
effect on raiding in a primary." 6
that section 186 "imposed a legitimate time limitation" on the petitioner's
62. Id.
63. In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) Mr. Justice Stewart pointed
out that "even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that
purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative
abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same
basic purpose." Accord, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
64. N.Y. ELECTION LAw § 332 (McKinney 1964) provides in pertinent part:
1. The supreme court or a justice thereof within the judicial district,
or the county judge within his county, in a proceeding instituted by a duly
enrolled voter of a party, at least ten days before a primary. election, shall
direct the enrollment of any voter with such party to be cancelled if it appears either that any material statement in the declaration of the voter
upon which he was enrolled is false ...
2. The chairman of the county committee of a party with which a voter
is enrolled in such county, may, . . . after a hearing . . . determine that

the voter is not in sympathy with the principals of such party. .

.

. [T]he

enrollment of such voter [may] be cancelled if it appears . . . that such

determination is just.
65. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. at 762 n.10.
66. Id. But see In re Mendelsohn, 197 Misc. 993, 99 N.Y.S.2d 438 (Sup. Ct.
1950); Zuckman v. Donahue, 191 Misc. 399, 79 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 274
App. Div. 216, 80 N.Y.S.2d 698, aff'd mem., 298 N.Y. 627, 81 N.E.2d 371 (1948);
Werbel v. Gernstein, 191 Misc. 275, 78 N.Y.S.2d 440 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 273 App.
Div. 917, 78 N.Y.S.2d 926 (1948); In re Newkirk, 144 Misc. 765, 259 N.Y.S. 434
(Sup. Ct. 1931). Also the Supreme Court's opinion in Rosario failed to mention
the criminal sanctions available in Article 16 of the New York Election Law for
violations of the elective franchise. These sanctions further enhance the state's ability to prevent "raiding." See N.Y. ELECTION LAw §§ 421, 436 (McKinney Supp.
1972).
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enrollment. 67 Thus, as pointed out in Mr. Justice Powell's dissenting
opinion: "The Court . . .fails to address the critical question of whether
,[the state's] interest may be protected adequately by less severe measures."086 Furthermore, Mr. Justice Powell believes that a less drastic
enrollment deadline (thirty to sixty days prior to the primary election)
would prevent most "raiding" activity, yet at the same time allow "honest"
voters a reasonable opportunity to switch parties prior to the primary
election without denying them their right to vote. 69 Surely, a less drastic
time limitation could have accomplished the same end, without imposing
such a heavy burden on those who choose to switch political parties for
70
legitimate purposes.
The Court's reasoning for sanctioning the cut-off date thirty days prior
to the preceding general election as meeting the "least drastic means" test
was based on the alleged inconsistency a voter would face in planning to
vote for one party in a general election while at the same time switching
his political affiliation with the intention of "raiding" another political
party eight months hence. 71 The amount of cognitive dissonance involved
in switching parties prior to a general election would, no doubt, be hard
67. 410 U.S. at 762. Mr. Justice Stewart's conclusion in Rosario seems to contradict his opinion concerning the "least drastic means" test which he discussed in
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). See note 62 supra. This apparent
contradiction might be explained by the particular situation found in Rosario. Justice Stewart emphasized the fact that the petitioners in Rosario did not explain why
they failed to enroll prior to the cut-off date. Justice Stewart also emphasized the
fact that the petitioners did not claim that they were unaware of the cut-off date.
By concluding that the petitioners could have enrolled, but chose not to, Mr. Justice
Stewart put the blame not on the statute, but on the petitioners themselves. 410
U.S. at 758. This factor seems to have been decisive in Justice Stewart's decision
to uphold the New York statute. It is quite possible that Justice Stewart believed
that the petitioners did not comply with the cut-off date intentionally in order to
subject the election law in question to the rudiments of a judicial test. If, in fact,
the petitioners had stated a valid reason why they had failed to enroll on time, the
Court's decision might have been in their favor.
68. Id. at 770.
69. Id. at 771.
70. The appellate court in Rosario pointed out that New York "has a particular
interest in preventing raiding," since
[i]n addition to the major parties, Democrat and Republican, two minority
parties, Conservative and Liberal, are established throughout the state and
usually present a full slate of candidates in the general election. Yet as
there are only 107,000 enrolled Conservatives and 109,000 enrolled Liberals
as opposed to 2,950,000 enrolled Republicans and 3,565,000 enrolled Democrats, successful raiding of these minority parties would present little difficulty on statewide basis absent § 186.
458 F.2d 649, 652 n.3 (2d Cir. 1972). Obviously, this factor had an influence on
the Court's decision to uphold such a drastic means. However, even in this situation,

there is no evidence that "raiding" occurs more frequently than "honest" switches of
affiliation against "raiders."
71. See note 34 supra.
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to measure. Yet, it would seem that such dissonance would be a greater
deterrent to "honest" switches in party affiliation than to those bent on
sabotaging another political party. Moreover, placing the cut-off date for
enrollment eight months in advance of a primary deprives the voter of
making a rational decision in choosing a political party, since many of the
candidates, let alone the issues, are not even known at that time.
Thus, forcing the voter to enroll in a political party eight months prior
to the primary election in order to be eligible to vote in that primary deprives the voter of the opportunity to make a rational decision and may
distort the results of the primary by not allowing the voter to vote for the
true candidate of his choice. Such distortion would seriously undermine the validity of the primary election results. A cut-off date one or
two months prior to the primary election would undoubtedly aid the voter
in making a more educated and rational decision in choosing which party
to enroll in, while still acting as a preventative to party "raiding."
A second weakness in the Court's opinion can be found in its decision not to grant the petitioner's standing to argue that section 186 conflicts with the 1970 amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965.72
Avoiding the plaintiff's allegations, the Court has left open the question
of whether or not the Voting Rights Act was meant to apply to primary
elections as well as to presidential elections. 73 42 U.S.C. § 19731(c)(1)
74
seems to indicate that section 1973 aa-l(d) is applicable to primaries.
An in depth examination by the Court on this issue would have been
helpful.
72.

Petitioners alleged that 42 U.S.C. § 1973 aa-l(d) specifically prohibits an

otherwise qualified voter from being denied the right to vote in a presidential primary for failure to comply with any type of durational residency requirement. See
Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 759 n.9 (1973).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1 (1970) provides that
each State shall provide by law for registration or, other means of qualifi-

cation of all duly qualified residents . . . not later than thirty days immediately prior to any presidential election, for registration or qualification
to vote . . . in such election.
Cf. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 563-67 (1968). But cf. Rosario
v. Rockefeller, 458 F.2d 649, 654 (2d Cir. 1972) where the appellate court argued

that § 1973 aa-1 (d) did not apply to votes cast in presidential primaries.
74.

See note 6 supra.

H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1965)

states:
Clause (1) of [The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 I(c)(1)]
• . . contains a definition of the term "vote" for purposes of all sections of
the act. The definition makes it clear that the act extends to all elections
-Federal, State, local, primary, special, or general-and to all actions

connected with registration, voting, or having a ballot counted in such elections.
(Emphasis added).
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In estimating the possible effects of Rosario on future decisions, the
subjectivity of the "compelling state interest" test needs to be kept in
mind. That is, the individual needs of a state will have to be taken into
consideration before the Court can determine whether or not a statute
designed to prevent harm to the integrity of the American political process meets that state's "compelling interest." Thus, a statute that meets the
test in one state may fail in another. Moreover, the stringency or absolute effect of the statute itself will determine whether or not it is acceptable. This latter determination was clearly pointed out by the Supreme
Court's decision in Pontikes to overturn the Illinois election law.7 5 The
Court was careful to note that although Mrs. Pontikes was not absolutely
precluded from associating with the Democratic party, she was absolutely precluded from voting in the Democratic party's election. As the
Court said:
mhe Illinois statute deprived her of any voice in choosing the party's
candidates, and thus substantially abridged her ability to associate effectively
76
with the party of her choice.

Thus, the line of demarcation where one's freedom of political association becomes "substantially abridged" can be drawn at the point where
the state absolutely denies one of his right to vote in any political party
primary. This line of demarcation is the distinguishing factor between
the New York and Illinois election laws.
CONCLUSION

The Court's failure to declare the statute in Rosario unconstitutional
as "substantially abridging" one's freedom of political association (merely
because the statute did not absolutely deny the petitioners of their right
to vote) is unfortunate. State imposed obstacles on the road to the voting polls should not have to be insurmountable before they are declared
unconstitutional. A weighing of the state's interest in the prevention
of party "raiding" against a citizen's right to participate in the primary
election of his choice would be a more reasonable manner in which to
determine whether or not a person's right to vote and/or right of political
association have been "substantially abridged." In the words of Mr.
Justice Black:
No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in
the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens,
75. Kusper v. Pontikes, 42 U.S.L.W. 4003, 4006 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1973).
76. Id.
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we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right
77
to vote is undermined.

Although the Supreme Court's opinion in Rosario may presently seem
to be a step backwards from Justice Black's words of wisdom, hopefully,
it will eventually be viewed as only a side-step taken to avoid a particular
situation which could have hindered the integrity of the political process.
In the more immediate future, Rosario will add to the ammunition of
those states desiring to impose requirements under which the right of
suffrage may be exercised. 78 In the final analysis, the greater a state's
need to impose requirements on the right to vote in order to protect the
integrity of the political process, the greater the probabilities are that
those requirements will pass the "compelling state interest" test provided,
of course, that the requirements imposed do not absolutely deprive citizens of their right to vote.
Neal Taslitz*

77. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1963).
78. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45
(1959); Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904); Mason v. Missouri, 179 U.S. 328
(1900).

* The author dedicates this case note to the memory of the late Thomas George
Krepps, a 1973 graduate of the De Paul University College of Law.

